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Abstract
People who intend to act upon an opportunity that arises are more likely to implement
their intentions if they anticipate a high level of regret of not acting. People who intend to
choose a specific alternative over others from a set are more likely to implement their
intentions if they anticipate a low level ofregret of making the wrong choice. These
moderating effects ofanticipated regret on act- and choice-consistency were found, while
accounting for the effects ofattitude strength, in a large scale longitudinal study conducted
during national elections in the Netherlands. In addition, the results reveal that the regret
people experience after the elections is determined by intention-behavior inconsistency and
not by the mere action or inaction in the elections.Regret and windows of opportunity
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Sometimes, a window ofopportunity arises in which people may execute their
intentions or express their preferences. Valentine's day is a once-a-year opportunity to
communicate one's secret love by sending an admired person a postcard or flowers. Every
four years or less, people are invited to vote in presidential elections, to vote for congress or
in local elections. Valentine's day and elections constitute specific, brief periods in time
when preferences can be voiced. Sometimes windows ofopportunities are longer periods,
such as the summer months when people can take a vacation, or the semester when
academics can enjoy a sabbatical leave, but ofien windows of opportunities are relatively
short periods in time when people can act and make a specific choice. Responses to windows
of opportunity can be contrasted to situations where people actively seek out opportunities to
cxpress their preferences. Windows of opportunity are environmentally triggered, and befall
on us. I'eople make use of the window or not, that is, they send a postcard or not, and vote or
not, and when they do, they chose one specific altemative over the others, namely, they
choose a particular card to send, or select a specific party to vote on.
Windows of opportunity are generally characterized by the following features. First,
windows of opportunity have a relatively short duration: they pass by quickly. People have to
act and choose neither before nor aRer but within the window. One cannot vote the day
before the elections nor send a postcard a day after Valentine's day. Second, windows of
opportunity are infreauent so that it matters to consider them seriously. Ifone dcesn't act, the
window closes, nothing changes, and the status quo continues. Then, one has to wait another
year for the next summer months to take a holiday, or another four years for the next election
to vote in. Third, windows ofopportunity are typically of some sienificance because the
decisions and choices to be made relate to important interests or current concerns ofpeople
(Frijda, 1987; Klinger, 1996). The infrequency and short duration of windows of opportunity
amplifies this. Fourth, windows ofopportunity are often foreseeable, such as elections,
Valentine's day, summer months and sabbatical leaves. Since windows ofopportunity are
short, infrequent, significant, and foreseeable, people are likely to form behavioral intentions
whether or not and how to make use of the opportunity.Regret and windows of opportuni~y
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Because windows ofopportunity are intrequent, short, foreseeable and significant, the
decisions and choices in the window of opportunity aze especially prone to the emotion of
regret. Regret is a negative, cognitively based emotion that we experience when realizing or
imagining that our present situation would have been better, had we acted or chosen
ditferently. Wasting a window of opportunity may produce regret in several ways. First, one
may regret not having acted afrer the window has closed. Second, when one did act on the
opportunity in time, one may end up regretting having selected the 'wrong' alternative.
"I'heorists in the field of behavioral decision making, economists (Bell, 1982; Loomes Rc
Sugden, 1982) as well as psychologists (Janis 8c Mann, 1977), have argued thai people can
anticipate this possible future regret and choose in such a way that they will minimize the
potential ofregret. More specifically, Janis and Mann (1977) specify that the anticipation of
regret is promoted if the negative consequences from a decision materialize almost
immediately after the decision is made, which ties in with the finite, short duration of
windows ofopportunity. The anticipation of regret is also stimulated when significant
persons in the decision maker's social network view the decision as important, which is
frequently the case in windows of opportunity such as voting in elections and taking a
sabbatical leave. The anticipation ofregret is stimulated as well when feedback inforrnation
about the outcomes ofdecisions can be obtained, which is the case in windows of
opportunity such as elections, where voting results become available almost immediately.
This leads to the first goal of this study: to examine the impact that anticipated regret
has on the consistency between behavioral intentions and behavior in a specific window of
opportunity, voting in national elections. An extensive literature exists on attitudinal
qualities, personality characteristics, and situational factors that moderate the consistency
between attitudes, intentions and behavior (Petty 8c Krosnick, 1995). Yet, research to date
has virtually neglected the role of anticipated emotions in attitude-intention-behavior
consistency, although their potential relevance in moderating consistency has been suggested
(e.g., Schwarz 8c Bohner, 1996; Taylor 8c Pham, 1996). We selected voting in elections for
this study because it constitutes a short, infrequent, significant, foreseeable window of
opportunity, which involves all eligible people simultaneously, and in which people are usedRegret and windows of opportunit~
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to form intentions and report behavior. While voting in elections is a specific research
context, we expect that the results ofthe study will generalize to other windows of
opportunity.
'fhe second goal of this study is to examine the impact that intention-behavior
consistency has on the regret that people experience after national elections. After the
window of opportunity has closed people may experience the regret ofhaving made a
specitic decision or choice. There is a growing literature on the regret that people experience
in their lives, and on the antecedents and consequences ofthese regrets (e.g., Landman, 1993;
Gilovich 8c Medvec, 1994, 1995; Zeelenberg 1999). While much attention has been devoted
to the differential effects ofaction and inaction on regret, the impact that attitude-intention-
behavior-consistency has on the regret that people experience has not been examined. The
results of the present study have implications for the psychology ofattitudes and action, and
for theories of the determinants and consequences ofregret. In the next section we first
describe the distinct forms ofintention-behavior consistency that may present themselves in
windows ofopportunity. Next, we examine the role of anticipated and experienced regret in
intention-behavior consistency in detail.
Forms of [ntention-Behavior Consistency
People form intentions to make or not make use of an opportunity that presents itself.
Such implementation intentions are helpful when opportunities are important and when they
require fast and efficient behavioral responses (Gollwitzer, 1996). Ifpeople intend to make
use oftlie opportunity, they form intentions to choose one altemative over the others, if
multiple altematives are available. They form the intention to vote for party X or Y, to have
the sabbatical leave at university X or Y, or to send person X or Y flowers for Valentine's
day. During the period that the window of opportunity is open, they actually act or not, and if
they act they choose the alternative they intended to choose or not. This leads to the tive
distinct forms of intention-behavior consistency, presented in Figure l, that are the basis of
the present study.
"' INSER"I' FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE'"~`Regret and windows uf opportunit~
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In our framework we distinguish two levels of intention-behavior consistency. Act-
consistencv expresses whether people behave according to their intention to make use of the
opportunity or not. Choice-consistency expresses whether people behave according to their
intention to choose a specific choice alternative over others.
People in group A in Figure 1 are act-consistent, because they intend to not make use
of the opportunity and actually follow up on this. Choice-consistency does not apply to them,
because they had no prior intention to choose a specific alternative. People in group E3 are
act-inconsistent, because they intend to not make use ofthe opportunity that arises, but
actually make use ofthe opportunity anyway for some reason. Choice-consistency does not
apply to them either, because they had no prior intention to choose a specific alternative.
People in group C are act-inconsistent, because they intend to act and to choose a specitic
altemative, but eventually do not make use ofthe opportunity anyway for some reason.
People in group D are act-consistent because they intend to make use ofthe opportunity and
do so, but they are choice-inconsistent because they intend to choose alternative X but wind
up choosing alternative Y. Finally, people in group E are act-consistent and choice-
consistent, because they intend to act and do so, and they intend to choose altemative X and
do so.
The framework in Figure 1 indicates that groups A, D and E are all act-consistent,
albeit in different ways. Group A is act-consistent bv omission, because it comprises people
who are consistent by not acting. Groups D and E aze act-consistent bv commission, because
they comprise people who aze consistent by acting.
Of course not all five forms ofintention-behavior consistency are relevant in all
windows ofopportunity. If the window is restricted to the decision to adopt a single
alternative or not (Jones, Frisch, Yurak, á Kim, 1998), only act-consistency is relevant. All
tive forms of intention-behavior consistency apply to choice among alternatives in a window
of opportunity, such as voting behavior in elections. In elections, people intend to vote or not,
they intend to choose party X, person Y, program Z, and they follow up on these intentions
or not. The issue whether anticipated regret can moderate the distinct forms of intention-
behavior consistency is addressed next.Regret and windows ofopportunit~
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Anticipated Regret in [ntention-Behavior Consistency
Allport (1935) chazacterized attitudes as having the potential to be both directive and
motivational. "fhat is, attitudes may guide behavior in one direction or another, acting as a
choice heuristic, and attitudes may also motivate or energize behavior. Recently, Fazio
(1995) argued that although the directive in8uence ofattitudes on behavior is unquestionable,
the motivational or energizing value of attitudes is more doubtful. In fact, like others, he does
not see why "the mere fact that one has an attitude would ... produce behavior in and of
itself' (Calder 8c Ross, 1973, p. 7).
Research has shown that strona attitudes, those attitudes that are held with certainty,
that are based on extended thinking and elaboration, and that are accessible (cf. Krosnick 8c
Petty, 1995), are better predictors of behavior than weak attitudes. But even when the effect
of attitude strength is taken into account, the consistency between attitudes, intentions and
behavior is usually still less than complete (Fazio, 1995). So, while attitude strength increases
the likelihood that attitudes and intentions can guide behavior, other factors may increase the
likelihood that attitudes and intentions motivate or energize behavior. We believe that
anticipated regret, a specific emotion, is such a factor that is important in windows of
opportunity.
Most research has examined attitude-behavior consistency, instead of intention-
behavior consistency (Kraus, 1995). But because intentions are assumed to be direct
precursors of behavior, and are frequently better predictors of behavior than attitudes (Ajzen,
1996), finding a significant moderating effect ofanticipated regret on intention-behavior
consistency would even be more telling. Since, most research has examined moderators of
attitude-behavior consistency we will build on this literature to build the hypotheses for the
present study.
Moderating Effèct of Anticipated Reeret
Regret is a negative emotion that arises from comparing an obtained outcome with a
better outcome that might have occurred had a different choice been made; that is, regret
stems from bad decisions. Regret is the second most frequently mentioned emotion in
everyday language (Shimanoff, 1984), and it is strongly associated with feeling personallyRegret and windows ofopportunity
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responsible, tèeling that one should have known better, thoughts about the mistake one made.
Regret is associated with specific action tendencies, actions and emotivational goals
(Roseman, Wiest, á Swartz, 1994), such as the tendency to "kick yourself," to correct one~s
mistake, to wanting to undo the event and wanting a second chance (Zeelenberg, van Dijk,
Manstead ác van der Pligt, 1998).
As assumed by regret theory, people are motivated to avoid post-decisional regret (cf.
Bell, 1982; Loomes 8z Sugden, 1982). They anticipate the possibility of regret, and takc this
into account when making decisions (e.g., Larrick 8r. Boles, 1995; Ritov, 1996). Janis and
Mann (] 977) argue that fear for future regret induces decision-makers to make more
"rational" choices that lower the likelihood ofhaving to kick oneself afterwards. Specitically,
in choice between alternatives, anticipated regret promotes increased risk-seeking or risk-
avoidance, depending on which of the possible choice options is the regret minimizing option
(Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der Pligt, 8c de Vries, ]996). For instance, in a choice between a
risky and a safe tinancial option, people prefer the safe option if they will only receive
feedback about the financial performance of the chosen option. Yet, they prefer the risky
option if, in addition, they will receive feedback about the risky option (Zeelenberg 8c
Beattie, 1997).
No research to date has examined the moderating effect of anticipated regret on
a[titude-intention-behavior consistency. Yet some research suggests the possibility of such an
effect. Taylor and Pham (1996) argue that the strong and passionate affect stimulated by
mentally simulating an event evokes the arousal and motivation necessary for action. Such
anticipated affective reactions influence the behavioral intentions that prepare for action,
independent from attitudes toward the behavior (Richard, van der Pligt, 8c de Vries, 1996).
When executing one's behavioral intentions, anticipated affect leads to increased levels of
effort (Bagozzi, Baumgartner, á Pieters, 1998). This suggests that behavioral intentions are
more likely to motivate or energize the target behavior, when they are embodied with
anticipated regret.
People who intend to act upon the opportunity can anticipate the regret of not having
acted upon the opportunity, and they can anticipate the regret ofhaving chosen a specificRegret and windows ofopportuníty
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option over the other ones. Which predictions can be made about the moderating impact of
anticipated regret on the distinct forms of intention-behavior consistency in our framework?
People who intend not to vote in the elections don't have to do anything to be
consistent. By letting the window of opportunity pass without action these people become
act-consistent by omission. Yet, people who intend to vote have to actively engage in
behaviors to make use of the opportunity. To execute the intention to vote in 1he elections
some level of motivation is needed to overcome inertia, and the anticipated regret of not
acting may provide this. Hence, we hypothesize that the lowest level of regret of not acting is
anticipated by people who do not intend to vote (group A and B in Figure 1). Also, we
predict that people who intend to vote and actually do so (group D and E) anticipate the
highest level of regret. We expect that people who intend to vote but eventually do not vote
(group C), anticipate more regret than people who do not intend to vote at all (groups A and
B), but less regret than people who intend to vote and actually do so (groups D and E). Note
that we do not merely predict that higher levels ofanticipated regret generally lead to higher
levels ofact-consistency. We predict that higher levels ofanticipated regret promote act-
consistency for people who intend to vote. It thus promotes act-consistency by commission
(groups D and E vs. group C).
Does anticipated regret also moderate choice-consistency? Emotions have
informational properties that guide behavior (Schwartz ~ Bohner, 1996), and anticipated
regret has specific informational properties (Roseman et al., 1994). Anticipated regret signals
people that they might make a mistake, and that they might want to do something different
from what they intend to do (cf Zeelenberg, 1999). This suggests that people who intend to
vote for party X, but who anticipate a high level ofregret when they receive feedback
information that party Y needed their vote more, will be more inclined to actually vote for Y.
Such people express choice-inconsistency. Conversely, people who intend to vote for party
X, and who anticipate little regret when they discover that party Y needed their vote more,
are more likely to retain their original choice of party X. Such people express choice-
consistency. We hypothesize that people will be more choice-consistent if they anticipate less
regret of making a wrong choice. The hypothesis is supported if people who intend to voteRegret and windows of opportunity
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for party X and actually do so (group E) anticipate less regret ofmaking a wrong choice than
people who intend ro vote for party X and actually vote for another party (group D).
Accountinu for Attitude Stren~th
One may wonder whether anticipated regret is any different tiom other factors that
may moderate intention-behavior consistency, such as attitude strength. It is important
therefore to account for other factors such as attitude strength (cf. Krosnick 8c Petty, 1995)
that may capture the moderating effect ofanticipated regret. Two specific attitudinal strength
variables, temporal stability and amount of thinking, are singled out because they are
pertinent to behavior in a window of opportunity, moderate attitude-intention-behavior
consistency among others in elections, and may do so independently. These properties ensure
that potential moderating eiects ofanticipated regret are not confounded with moderating
effects ofattitude strength (see Wegener, Downing, Krosnick, R Petty, 1995).
Temporal stability is an important consequence of attitude strength (Fazio, 1995).
Strong attitudes and intentions are held with certainty, and they persist over time (Krosnick 8c
Petty, 1995). The more stable the temporal pattern ofintentions is, the more likely it is that
people express behavior that is consistent with the (most recent) intentions (cf. Fazio 8c
Williams, 1986). In a meta-analysis, Kraus (1995) found a large, significant effect ofthe
tempural stability of attitudes on attitude-behavior consistency. A similar moderating effect
of intention stability on intention-behavior consistency is expected here.
The amount of thinking or elaboration that people engage in during attitude and
intention formation is a key antecedent of attitude strength. Krosnick and Petty (1995)
summarize research showing that amount ofthinking is strongly correlated with attitude
strength dimensions such as attitude importance, attitude certainty and extremíty, and with
perceived knowledge. Brown (1974) found that amount ofthinking moderates attitude-
intention-behavior consistency in the context of students' breaking various laws such as drug
use. Petty, Cacioppo, Kao and Rodriguez (1986) found that individual differences in need for
cognition, the disposition to think and enjoy that, moderated attitude-behavior consistency in
presidential elections. Pieters and Verplanken (1995) found in an election study that amount
of thinking moderated intention-behavior consistency directly, and that the moderatingRegret and windows of opportonity
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effecis of need for cognition and personal relevance were mediated by amount of thinking. In
related research concerning voting behavior, Davidson, Yantis, Norwood and Montano
(1985) found that the amount ofinformation that people had about the attitude object
moderated attitude-behavior consistency. We predíct that amount ofthinking moderates
in[ention-behavior consistency in the present study.
It is not obvious that anticipated regret moderates intention-behavior consistency
when the effect ofattitude strength is accounted for. lanis and Mann (1977) maintain that the
anticipation ofregret stimulates people to think more elaborately before making a tinal
decision. Likewise, Posavac, Sabonmatsu and Fazio (1997, p.260) argue that the extent to
which ".. one fears reaching a costly and inappropriate decision is likely to affect the
thoroughness with which possible altematives are generated." So, anticipated regret might
promote more thought and more careful comparison of choice altematives, which in turn may
moderate intention-behavior consistency directly. In that case, the moderating effect of
anticipated regret on intention-behavior consistency is capttued by the amount ofthinking
people engage in. Likewise, the moderating effect ofanticipated regret on intention-behavior
consistency may be captured by temporal intention stability. Some research suggests that if
the cost of being wrong increases, the certainty about one's attitudes decreases (Cohen,
laffray, 8r. Said, 1985). A high cost of being wrong promotes anticipation of regret, and
decreased attitude certainty may lead to temporal instability. If this process takes place, the
moderating effect ofanticipated regret on intention-behavior consistency is captured by
temporal (in)stability of intentions.
In summary, we hypothesize that higher levels of anticipated regret ofnot voting lead
to act-consistency for people who intend to vote, and that lower levels of anticipated regret of
voting for the wrong party lead to choice-consistency for those people. We expect that the
moderating effects emerge even while simultaneously accounting for the effect of intention
stability and amount ofthinking about the elections.
Intention-Behavior Consistency and Experienced Regret
The preponderance ofresearch on the experience of regret has emphasized the ef~ect
of action versus inaction (e.g., Gilovich, Bc Medvec, 1994, 1995; Kahneman, 8c l~versky,Regret and windmvs of opportuni[y
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1982; Landman, 1993). In a series of studies, Gilovich and Medvec (1994, 1995) found that
people regret actions more than inactions in the short run, but inactions more than actions in
the long run. As a case in point, Hattiangadi, Medvec and Gilovich (1995) re-analyzed data
from Lewis Terman and found that 54a~o ofthe regrets that people indicated at the end of their
lives were regrets of inaction, 410~o were regrets of action and 340~o were indeterminate. If we
examine the specific regrets mentioned by Terman's individuals (Hattiangadi et al., 1995.
Table 1) more closely, it appears that most regrets of inaction refer to something that the
individual did not do, but had intended to do or in hindsight should have done. The dominant
regret of inaction was "should have completed college or graduate school; not have
interrupted education." In addition, most regrets ofaction covered things that the individual
did do, but had intended not to do or in hindsight should not have done. The dominant regrets
of action included, e.g., "shouldn't have smoked; should have conquered alcoholism earlier."
A cite from the American Book ofPrayer in Gilovich and Medvec (1995, p. 379) expresses
this as follows "We have lefr undone those things which we ought to have done; and we have
done those things which we ought not to have done."
In other words, it is perhaps not action or inaction cer se, but the inconsistency
between our intentions or other guides of conduct and our behavior that drives experienced
regret Some findings support this conjecture. People have the tendency to complete what
thev started out to do, and to do what they intended to do (Gollwitzer, 1996). Developing a
behavioral intention leads to a state oftension that remains until the task is completed and the
behavior is performed (Lewin, 1951; Tesser, Martin, á Comell, 1996). Therefore, people
tend to remember incomplete tasks and unrealized goals better than those that have been
finished, accomplished or resolved (Zeigarnick, 1935). Not executing one's behavioral
intention, particularly in a window ofopportunity that is infrequent and important, results in
a lost opportunity, and people who think about the opportunity they lost experience regret
(Roseman et al., 1994). Thus, we maintain that intention-behavior inconsistency drives
regret, in addition to the well-documented et~fects of action-inaction.
Specifically, we predict that people who are act-consistent by omission (group A in
Figure 1) will experience the same low level of regret of (not) acting as people who are act-Regret and windows of opportunity
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consistent by commission (groups D and E), because both are act-consistent. People who are
act-inconsistent either because they act although they intended not to (group B) or because
thcy did not act although they intended to act (group C) will experience a hi~~her level of
regret of (not) acting than people who are act-consistent (groups A, D and E).
"Ihe specific choices that people make when they act may promote regret as well.
Inspection of the regrets that Terman's individuals reported (Hattiangadi et al., 1995, Table
1), indicates that the third category of regrets, which was labeled "indeterminate," contains
many choices between alternatives. In fact over 70"~0 ofthe regrets in the "indeterminate"
category are about making a different choice, for example, "should have chosen a different
occupation," "should have chosen different subjects," "should have chosen different mate."
Wíll people who are choice-inconsistent (group D) experience more regret oftheir specific
choice than people who are choice-consistent (group E)? Consistency is highly valued in
society, and people experience a tension when their behavior is inconsistent with their
intention (e.g., Festinger, 1957). This suggests that people who are choice-inconsistent
(group D) will experience more regret oftheir specific choice than people who are choice-
consistent (group E). Hence, we predict that in the context of voting in elections wasting the
opportunity to execute one's behavioral intentions, and not action-inaction cer se, is
regrettable.
Our predictions about the moderating effect of anticipated regret on intention-
behavior consistency, and about the effect of intention-behavior consistency ofexperienced
regret were tested in a longitudinal study of voting intentions and behaviors in national
elcctions in the Netherlands.
Method
Particiaants
Participants were members of the Telepanel ofNIPOIGallup Market Research in the
Netherlands. Members of the NIPO Teleoanel have been provided with a personal computer
and a modem at home. Questionnaires are send to the panel members by modem, completed
during the weekend, and returned to NIPO by modem again. The sample ís representative for
the Netherlands and consists ofabout 1,800 people of 18 years and older. In total 1137Kegret and ~~ indows of opportunit~
la
members of the Telepanel participated in the present study, 538 males and 581 females.
Average age of the participants is 47.3 years, 23.7"~o has a college degree or higher.
Procedure
The study was performed in the context ofthe elections for the Second Chamber in
the Netherlands (eyuivalent ofthe Congress in the US), which were held in week 19 on
Wednesday May G, 1998. Prior to the elections there had been a widely supported coalition
government of liberals, social democrats, and liberal democrats. More than 12 parties ran in
the elections, including in addition to the parties who had been in government, several
religious parties, environmental parties, partics for the elderly, extreme right wing parties.
parties for small business and retailers. All Dutch citizens above 18 years can vote at the
designated voting office in one's neighborhood. Voting is done electronically on computer
terminals with a special pen.
Participants' voting intentions were assessed in week l, week 12, 13, 14, 16, 17 and
finally in week 18, in the weekend directly preceding the Election Day. In addition,
participants were asked to indicate their actual voting behavior and their emotional responses
in the weekend directly after the Election Day. Voting intentions in weeks I, 12, 13, 14, 1G,
17 were assessed with a single item. Items were incorporated in larger yuestionnaires that
covered various issues unrelated to voting or party preference. This was done to minimize
sensitization and freezing effects ofassessing intentions. The questionnaires directly
preceding and following the Election Day contained about 25 questions, and they were also
incorporated in larger questionnaires covering other issues.
Ouestionnaires
Intentions and Behavior. Voting intentions prior to the weekend preceding the
elections were assessed with the following item: "On which political party would you vote
for if there would be elections for the Second Chamber today?" Voting intentions in the
weekend preceding the elections were assessed with the following item: "Which political
party do you expect to vote for this Wednesday May 6 in the elections for the Second
Chamber?" Both voting intention items had the following response altematives (a description
ofthe party position is added here between pazentheses): (1) CDA (Christian democrats), (2)Regret and windows of opportunity
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PVDA (Social democrats), (3) VVD (Liberals). (4) D66 (Liberal democrats), (5) Groen Links
(Environmentalists), (6) SGP (Orthodox Christians), (7) RPF (Orthodox Christians), (8) GPV
(Orthodox Christians), (9) Centrum Democraten (Right extremists), (10) SP - Socialistische
partij (Socialists), (11) AOV ~ Unie 55-t- (Elderly), (12) Senioren 2000 (Elderly), (13) Other
party, (14) I would not vote, (15) [ do not know, (16) I don't want to tell you, (17) I am not
allowed to vote. Response alternatives 1 to 12 are specific parties that ran in the elections.
Actual voting behavior was assessed with the followinb item: "Which political party
did you vote for last Wednesday May 6 in the Elections for the Second Chamber?" Response
alternatives 1 to 13, and 16, 17 were the same as for the voting intentions. The other response
alternatives were: (14) I did not vote, (l5) I do riot remember, (18) 1 voted "blank".
Anticipated and Exaerienced Rearet. Anticipated regret was assessed separately for
the decision to act upon the opportunity, and for the specific choice made. Anticipated regret
about the decision to act was assessed with two items. The first item read: "[magine that you
have not voted on May 6, and the party ofyour preference has gathered an insufticient
number of votes, how much regret would you feel that you did not vote?" Response
alternatives were ( I) no regret, to (7) much regret. The second item read: "Imagine that you
have not voted on May 6, and the party ofyour preference has gathered an insufticient
number of votes, how annoyed would you feel that you did not vote?" Response alternatives
were ( I) not annoyed at all, to (7) very annoyed. Cronbach's alpha of the two items is .930.
The average score of the two items forms the measure of anticipated regret ofnot acting upon
the opportunity.
Anticipated regret about the specific choice made was assessed with two items as
well. The first item read: "Imagine that you did vote and another party, that would also have
been acceptable to you, has gathered an insufficient number ofvotes, how much regret would
you feel that you did not vote for that other party?" Response alternatives were the same as
above. The second item read: "Imagine that you did vote and another party, that would also
have been acceptable to you, has gathered an insufficient number of votes, how annoyed
would you feel that you did not vote for that other party?" Response alternatives were theRegret and windows ofopportunity
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same as above. Cronbach's alpha of the two items is .908. The average score of the two items
t~~nns the measure of anticipated regret ofthe specific choice made.
Experienced regret was assessed in the weekend directly following the Election Day.
separately for the decision to act upon the opportunity and for the specific choice made.
Experienced regret about the decision to act was assessed with two items. The first item for
people who indicated that they had not voted read: "Now that the outcomes of the elections
for the Second Chamber are known, how much regret do you feel that you did not vote."
Response alternatives were ( I) no regret, to (7) much regret. The second item for people who
had not voted read: "Now that the outcomes of the elections for the Second Chamber are
known, how annoyed do you feel that you did not vote?" Response alternatives were (1) not
annoyed at all, to (7) very annoyed. The same two questions, but worded affirmatively, were
asked to people who indicated that they had voted in the elections. Cronbach's alpha of the
two items was .823. The average score ofthe two items forms the measure ofexperienced
regret ofthe decision to (not-) vote.
Experienced regret about the specific choice made was assessed with two items. Only
people who indicated to have voted in the elections completed the items. The first item read:
"Now [hat the outcomes of the elections for the Second Chamber are known, how much
regret do you feel that you voted for ~party x~ and not for another party'?" Response
alternatives were the same as for the other regret items. The second item read: "Now that the
outcomes of the elections for the Second Chamber are known, how annoyed do you feel that
you voted for ~party x~ and not for another party?" In the computerized questionnaire, the
name ofthe specific party that people indicated they had voted for was added on the ~party
r~ spaces. Response alternatives were the same as above. Cronbach's alpha of the two items
was .912. The average score ofthe two items was used as a measure of experienced regret of
the specific choice made.
Intention Stability. People may have a long history ofintention stability but may have
recently become unstable in their intention. The opposite can occur as well: recent stability,
but overall instability in intentions (cf Bagozzi and Warshaw (1992) on frequency and
recency of past behavior). Hence, two measures of intention stability were constructed fromRegret and windows ofopportunity
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the behavioral intention measures collected in weeks 1, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17. First, the total
number of times out of 6 that people had the same behavioral intention as the one expressed
in week 18 was determined. The measure is 0 when people have a different behavioral
intention in all the weeks prior to week 18, and 6 when they have the same behavioral
intention in all weeks prior to week 18. This measure taps the frequencv of intention stability.
Second, it was determined if people had the same intention in week 17 as they had in week
I 8, ihe weekend before the elections. The measure is 0 ifpeople were inconsistent, and I if
they were consistent. This measure taps recencv of intention stability.
Amount of Thinkine. Two items in the questionnaire directly preceding the Election
Day assessed the amount ofthinking that people engage in before forming their behavioral
intention to vote or not and to choose a particular party. The first item read: "How much
thinking did you engage in to determine your choice for the Second Chamber elections of
May 6`?" Response alternatives were (1) very little thinking, to (7) very much thinking. The
second item read: "How much information did you collect to determine your choice for the
Second Chamber elections of May 6?" Response alternatives were (1) Very little information
collected, to (7) very much information collected. Cronbach's alpha of the two items was
.849. Scores were averaged across items to form an overall measure of "amount ofthinking."
Results
Intention-Behavior Consistency
Ofthe 1137 people who participated in the study, 7 were unwilling to communicate
their behavioral intention in week 18, 3 people were unwilling to communicate their actual
voting behavior in the weekend after the Election Day, 2 people indicated that they had no
right to vote, and one person indicated to have voted `blank.' These 13 people were excluded
from the subsequent analyses, leaving 1124 people in the sample.
Next the size ofthe groups that exhibit a distinct form ofintention-behavior
consistency was detetmined, as proposed in Figure 1. Group A, intention to not act - not act,
comprised 59 people. Group B, intention to not act - act, comprised 5 people. Group C,
intention to act - not act, comprised 44 people. Group D, intention to choose X- choose Y,
comprised 105 people. Group E, intention to choose X- choose X, comprised 911 people.Itcgret and ~~ indows of upportunity
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This shows that while the majority ofpeople was act-consistent (95.6"~0: 59 f 105 t 91 I), a
sizable number ofpeople was act-inconsistent (4.40~0: 5 f 44). Likewise, while the majority
ofpeople was choice-consistent (89.7"~0: 91 1), a sizeable number of people was choice-
inconsistent (10.3"~0: 105). Group B was excluded from the subsequent analysis because its
size (of5) is too small to draw reliable conclusions. All analyses in the sequel are based on
the 1 119 people in the four remaining consistency groups A, C, D and E.
To examine the moderating effect of anticipated regret on distinct forms of intention-
behavior consistency the following procedure is employed. First, differences between the
four consistency groups in anticipated regret, intention stability, and amount ofthinking are
explored using xz - analysis and one-way ANOVA's with post-hoc tests. This indicates
whether each of the measures ofanticipated regret and attitude strength independently
moderates act- and choice-consistency. The results do not yet indicate whether anticipated
regret moderates intention-behavior consistency when the impact ofattitude strength is taken
into account. To accomplish this, multinomial logit analyses (Long, 1997; McFadden, 1973)
are perfbrmed next. Multinomial logit is an extension of the binary logit model or logistic
regression model to the case of more than two outcomes. [n the multinomial logit analyses,
membership of the consistency groups (group A to E) acts as the criterion variable, and the
measures ofanticipated regret and attitude strength act as the predictor variables. The
multinomial logit analyses test ifanticipated regret moderates distinct forms of intention
behavior consistency, when the effects of attitude strength are accounted for. The analyses
are performed with maximum likelihood estimation using the program Stata (Stata, 1997).
Differences between Consistencv Grouas in Anticiaated Reeret
To explore differences between the four intention-behavior consistency groups, one-
way ANOVA's with post-hoc tests were performed for anticipated regret, amount of thinking
and frequency of intention stability. For recency of intention stability, which is a yes - no
variable, a x' - analysis on the cross-tabulation of group-by-recency was performed. The
results ofthe analysis are offered in Table 1.
Inspection ofTable I shows that the four consistency groups differed significantly on
all measures. All F-values and the x' - value were signiticant at p ~.001. This means that allRegret and windows ofopporlunitr'
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measures moderated intention-behavior consistency. Specitic differences between the four
consistency groups become immediately clear as well from Table 1.
"' [NSERT "I'ABLE 1 ABOUT HERE t"
Groups A and E were equally stable in their intentions, and ihey were more stable
than the other two groups are. Apparently people who intended not to vote and who did not
vote, and people who voted for the party they intended to vote for, intended this all along.
Amount of thinking provides a different picture. Here, people who intended to vote but
cventually didn't (group C) had given more thought to the elections than people who had not
intended to vote in the tirst place (group A), but less than people who intended and actually
voted (groups D and E). Both intention stability and amount ofthinking appeaz to moderate
act- and choice-consistency.
More importantly, each ofthe four consistency groups differed significantly from the
others with respect to anticipated regret ofnot acting (i.e., not voting in the elections). Group
A anticipated the least regret ofnot acting (M - 2.20 on a 7-point scale), group C anticipated
more (M - 3.50), group D even more (M - 4.64), and group E anticipated most regret of not
acting (M - 5.41). The results concerning anticipated regret ofthe specific choice made, add
more detail to the emerging picture. Group A again anticipated the lowest level of regret of
making a specitic choice (M - 2.29), but now people in group D, who voted for a different
party thati they intended, anticipated the highest regret ofmaking a specific choice in the
elections (M - 3.46). Groups C(M - 2.99) and D(M - 3.06) were in between the two
extremes.
These results show that anticipated regret and attitude strength moderate distinct
forms of consistency between intentions and behavior. Next we examine whether anticipated
regret still moderates consistency when the impact of attitude strength is accounted for.
Moderatina Effect of Anticioated Reeret on Intention-Behavior Consisiencv
In Table 2 the results ofmultinomial logit analyses on the consistency groups are
summarized. In the analyses, each of the consistency groups is compared to a reference
group. Group E was selected as the reference group since it expresses both act- and choice-Re~,ret and windows of opportunity
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consistency. Of course, the choice of a reference group has no implications for model tit and
the significance ofparameter estimates.
'~" INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE "' .
The tirst three columns of Table 2 offer the comparison of respectively the
consistency groups A, C and D with the reference group E. Both the logit coefficients and the
p-values for the parameters are provided. In the last three columns ofTable 2, only the p-
values of the logit coefficients comparing A to C, A to D, and C to D are provided, for space
reasons. The value ofthe corresponding logit coefficients can be obtained by taking the
difference oftwo appropriate coefticients provided in the tirst three columns of Table 2(e.g.,
coefficient A ~ C- coefficient A ~ E- coefficient C ~ E, and so forth; cf. Long, 1997).
"rhe multinomial logit model titted the data very well, as indicated by the ~' (15) of
293.57, p ~.0001, and the s p eudo R' of .1953 I~. Overall, the model classified 72.60~0 of the
people correctly to their respective consistency group, and it classified all four consistency
groups significantly better than their marginal probability. This shows that anticipated regret,
intention stability and amount of thinking jointly moderated intention-behavior consistency
to a substantial degree. Inspection of[he logit coefficients indicates which measures were
most important in distinguishing the consistency groups.
It is immediately apparent from Table 2 that anticipated regret ofnot acting had a
large impact on consistency between intentions and behavior even when controlling for the
effect ofattitude strength. All logit ccefficients of anticipated regret of not acting were
statistically significant. Inspection of the sign and size of the logit coefficients indicates the
specitic direction and size that the moderating effects of anticipated regret take. People who
did not intend to vote and who actually didn't vote (group A) anticipated significantly less
regret ofnot acting than people who intended to vote for a specific party and who actually
voted for this party (group E) (coefficient A ~ E--1.063, p ~.001). Likewise, people who
intended to vote but actually did not vote (group C) (coefficient C ~ E--.606, p ~.00] ), and
people who intended to vote for a specific party but who actually voted for a different party
(group D) anticipated significantly less regret (coefficient D ~ E--.345, p ~.001) than peopleRegret and windows ofopportunity
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who intended to vote for a specific party and who actually voted for this party (group E) did.
Also, group A anticipated significandy less regret that group C(coefficient A ~ C-(-1.063) -
(-.606) --.457, p ~.010), and signiticantly less regret than group D(coefficient A ~ D--
718, p ~.001). Finally, group C anticipated significantly less regret of not acting than group
D(coefficient C ~ D--.261, p ~.049). These results support the hypothesis that anticipated
regret of not voting moderates act-consistency, even when the moderating effects of attitude
strength are accounted for. Specifically, a high level of anticipated regret promotes act-
consistency by commission.
Anticipated regret of the specific choice significantly differentiated between group A
and E(coefficient for A ~ E-.578, p ~.001), between group C and E(coefficient for C ~ E-
386, p ~.007), and between group D and E(coefficient for D ~ E-.295, p ~.001). The size
and sign of the logit coefficients indicates that, when controlling for the effects of the other
measures, anticipated regret of the specific choice made was substantially less for people who
are choice-consistent (group E), than for all other people. This supports the hypothesis that
anticipated regret of the specific choice made moderates choice-consistency.
The combined effects ofthe two measures of anticipated regret on act- and choice-
consistency were the largest of all moderators. When the two measures were dropped from
the multinomial logit model, the fit decreased to a X' (9) - 163.10 and a low s p eudo R' of
.108~ (x' (6) difference - 130.47, significant at p ~.001).
In contrast, intention stability moderated intention-behavior consistency only slightly,
when the eftècts of the other measures were taken into account. When intention stability was
dropped from the multinomial logit model, the fit decreased marginally to a xz (9) - 279.52
and a s p eudo R' of .1859 (xz (6) difference - 14.05, p-.03).
Amount of thinking moderated intention-behavior consistency, but only act-
consistency. When amount ofthinking was dropped from the multinomial model, the fit
decreases to a X'' (12) - 252.98 and a s p eudo R'` of .1683 (X~ (3) difference - 40.59, p ~.001).
Amount of thinking differentiated between all the consistency groups except between groups
D and E, who were both act-consistent but who differed in choice-consistency (coefficientRegret and Nindows of opportunih
028, p-.723). This implies that amount ofthinking moderates act-consistency but not
choice-consistency.
These results provide strong support for the hypotheses that anticipated regret
moderates distinct forms of intention-behavior consistency significantly and systematicallv
even when the moderating effects ofattitude strength are accounted for. "ihe issue whether
consistency between intentions and behavior also affects the regret that people experience
after the elections is addressed next.
Effect of Intention-Behavior Consistencv on Experienced Reeret
One-way ANOVA's (with post-hoc tests) were performed to explore ifpeople who
expressed different pattems of intention-behavior consistency also differed in the regret they
experienced after the elections. The results, offered in the bottom half of Table l, show that
this is in fact the case.
Differences in experienced regret of (not) acting were substantial, F(3, 1118) -
38.269, p ~.001. People who were act-inconsistent experienced a significantly higher level
ofregret (MC - 2.85) than both people who were choice-consistent by omission (1~ - 1.64)
or by commission (MD - I.69 and ME - 1.42), who did not differ significantly from each
other, as indicated by post-hoc tests at p ~.05. Differences in experienced regret ofthe
specific choice made were substantial as well, F(1, 1015) - 31.496, p ~.001. People who
were choice-inconsistent experienced a significantly higher level of regret (Mp - 1.8] ) than
people who were choice-consistent (ME - ].35).
Intention-Behavior Consistencv or Anticipated Resret and Attitude Streneth
Since our previous analyses showed that anticipated regret and attitude strength
moderate intention-behavior consistency, the effect ofintention-behavior consistency on
e~erienced regret may well be due to direct or indirect effects of anticioated regret and
attitude strength on experienced regret. To rule out this possibility, multiple regression
analyses were performed separately for experienced regret of(not) acting and for experienced
regret ofthe specitic choice made.Regret and windows ofopportunity
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Prior to the analyses, three dummy variables were constructed to distinguish between
the fi~ur consistency groups. The first dummy variable diffèrentiated group A(code - 1) from
group E(code - 0), the second dummy variable differentiated group C from group E, and the
third dummy variable differentiated group D from group E. This coding scheme facilitates
comparisons with the analysis on moderating effects of anticipated regret, Table 2. All three
dummy variables were entered when experienced regret of(not) acting was the criterion, and
the dummy variable distinguishing group D from group E was entered when experienced
rcgret of the specific choice made was the criterion. In both analyses the measures of
anticipated regret and attitude strength were entered as covariates.
The first multiple regression model accounted for almost 17"~0 ofvariation in
experienced regret of(not) acting, F(8, 1109) - 28.12, p ~.001. Ofthe covariates in the
analysis, only the two anticipated regret measures were statistically significant (both at g~
.001). Despite this, the dummy variable that distinguished people who are act-inconsistent
(group C) from people who are act- and choice-consistent (group E) remained statisticalty
signiticant at p ~.001 (coefticient - 1.147). Also, the dummy variable that distinguished
people who were act-consistent by omission (group A) from people who were act- and choice
consistent (group E) remained statistically insignificant (ccefficient --.166, p-.196).
Finally, the dummy variable that distinguished people who were act-consisient but choice-
inconsistent (group D) from people who were act- and choice-consistent (group E) remained
statistically insignificant (coefficient -.096, p-.286). These results show that act-
consistency drives experienced regret, independent of the direct effects ofanticipated regret
and attitude strength.
The second multiple regression model accounted for almost 12"~0 of variation in
experienced regret ofthe specitic choice made, F(6, 1008) - 22.28, p ~.001. Of the
covariates in the analysis, only the two anticipated regret measures were statistically
significant (both at p ~.001). Despite this, the dummy variable that distinguished people who
were choice-inconsistent (group D) from people who were choice-consistent (group E)
remained statistically significant (coefficient .315, p ~.001). These results show that choice-Regret and windo~~s of opportunih
consistency drives experienced regret, independent ofthe direct effects of anticipated regret
and attitude strength.
Act-Inconsistencv or Action-Inaction
We hypothesized, but did not explicitly test yet, that it is not the mere action-inaction
ofpeople but the inconsistency between intentions and behaviors that drives experienced
regret in a window ofopportunity. To provide a direct test of this hypothesis multiple
regression analyses were performed on the experienced regret of (not) acting. Prior to the
analyses a new dummy variable (inaction-action) was constructed which differentiates people
who do not act (groups A and C- 1) from people who do act in the elections (groups D and
E- 0). Next, the following four regression models were estimated.
In model 1 the previous covariates (anticipated regret and attitude strength) and the
inaction-action variable were entered as predictors. In model 2 the dummy variable
distinguishing act-inconsistent people (group C- 1) from the other people (groups A, D and
E- 0) was added to model 1 as an additional predictor. If the difference between model 2 and
model 1 is statistically significant, act-inconsistency determines experienced regret, in
addition to action-inaction. This was in fact the case: adding the act-inconsistency variable
was highly significant (F-change: model2 - model 1- 57.808, df- 1, 1110, p ~.001).
In model 3 the covariates and the dummy variable for act-inconsistency were entered
as predictors. In model 4 the inaction-action variable was added to model 3 as an additional
predictor. Ifthe difference between model 4 and model 3 is not signiíicant, action-inaction
does not determine experienced regret once the effect of act-inconsistency is accounted for.
This was in fact the case: adding the inaction-action variable was not significant (F-change:
model4 - model 3- 2.031, df - l, 1110, p-.154). These results strongly support the
hypothesis that act-inconsistency and not action-inaction drives experienced regret here.
Choice-Inconsistency or Election Outcomes
Ifcompazed to people who were choice-consistent, people who were choice-
inconsistent voted more frequently for parties that actually lost in the elections, they may
experience regret oftheir choice, not because they were inconsistent but because they made
the wrong choice. In that case the finding that intention-behavior consistency drives regretRegret and windows of opportunit}
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would be an artifact of the outcomes of the specific choices that people made in the elections.
To rule out this possibility multiple regression analyses on the experienced regret ofthe
specitic choice made were performed.
Prior to the analyses a new dummy variable was constructed: loser-winnec 'rhe
variable is 1 if the party that people voted for lost in the elections compared to the results of
the previous election, and it is 0 if the party that people voted for won. Overall, 325 people
voted for a party that lost in the elections. Next, the loser-winner variable was added to the
regression model with the covariates of anticipated regret and attitude strength, and with the
variable distinguishing choice-inconsistent people (group D) from choice-consistent people
(group E). Although loser-winner had a statistically significant effect on experienced regret
of the specitic choice made (coefficient .146, p-.005), the etiect of choice-inconsistency
remained statistically significant (old coefficient .315 with p ~.001, new ccefficient .307
with Q ~.001), and it was more than twice as large as the effect of loser-winner. These results
show that choice-inconsistency drives experienced regret of the specific choice made, even
when the outcomes of the elections are accounted for.
Discussion
This study demonstrates that people's anticipated regret has systematic, significant
effects on the consistency between their behavioral intentions and behavior. A high level of
anticipated regret of not acting stimulated people with the intention to act upon a window of
opportunity, voting in national elections, to actually implement their intentions. A high level
of anticipated regret of the specific choice in the elections stimulated people with the
intention to choose a specitic alternative, to change their mind and choose a different
alternative. The moderating effects ofanticipated regret were strong, and were obtained while
the effect of attitude strength variables was accounted for. This study also reveals that
directly after the window ofopportunity closed, the regret that people experienced was
predominantly driven by the inconsistency between prior intentions and actual behaviors, and
not by the mere action or inaction ofpeople in the window ofopportunity. Specifically,
people who were act-inconsistent because they intended to vote but eventually did not vote
experienced significantly more regret than people who were act-consistent, either becauseRegret and windo~~s ofopportuni[}
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they intended not to vote and actually did not vote, or because they intended to vote and
actually voted. People who were choice-inconsistent because they voted for a different party
than they intended to vote for experienced significantly more regret than people who were
choice-consistent. The pattern ofresults was systematic, and it was obtained while
accounting for the effect ofpeople's anticipated regret before the elections. the effect of
attitude strength, and the actual outcomes of the elections.
Forms of Intention-Behavior Consistency
"fhe results have several implications for the psychology of actions and for theories
about the antecedents and consequences of the regret that people experience. Most research to
date has examined intention-behavior consistency as if consistency is a single homogenous
construct. This study demonstrates the utility of unraveling the distinct forms in which
intentions can be consistent and inconsistent with behaviors. It integrates findings from
attitude research, which has typically examined the decision to act, or not (Jones et aL, 1998;
Krosnick and Petty 1995), with findings from decision making research, which has
emphasized choice between alternatives (Posavac et al., 1997).
Distinguishing act-consistency, i.e., implementing the intention to act or not, from
choice-consistency, i.e., implementing the intention to choose a specific alternative over
others, claritied the role of anticipated regret and attitude strength in intention-behavior
consistency. For instance, anticipated regret moderated both act- and choice-consistency in
this study, but amount ofthinking moderated act-consistency only.
Distinguishing act-consistency by omission (ACO) from act-consistency by
commission (ACC) led to new insights as well. Specifically, people who were act-consistent
by commission anticipated more regret of not acting as compared to people who werc act-
inconsistent. Yet, people who were act-consistent by omission anticipated less regret of not
acting as compared to people who were act-inconsistent. This shows that anticipated regret
motivates people who intend to act to execute their intention. People who intend not to act
can be consistent without doing anything, hence their low level of anticipated regret of not
acting.Regret and windows ofopportunity
Distinguishing distinct forms of consistency allowed us to establish that act-
inconsistency and not action-inaction determined experienced regret, and that choice-
inconsistency determined experienced regret while accounting for the eftèct ofthe choice-
outcomes.
Simply treating intention-behavior consistency as a single, homogenous construct
would have obscured these findings, and would have led to erroneous conclusions about the
moderating effect ofanticipated regret and attitude strength in intention-behavior
consistency, and about the impact of intention-behavior consistency on the regret people
experience.
Re~;ret in the Action Sequence
Research on attitude-intention-behavior consistency has emphasized the role of
attitude strength, personality and situational factors (Petty, 8c Krosnick, 1995; Posavac et al.,
1997). Although there is a lazge, emerging stream ofresearch on the antecedents and
consequences ofanticipated regret in decision-making (see for a review, Zeelenberg, 1999),
few studies have examined the role of anticipated affect in attitude-behavior relations, and
more generally in the psychology of action (Gollwitzer, 8r, Bazgh, 1996).
[n a review ofthe role of feelings in the action sequence, Schwartz and Bohner (1996,
p. 128) conclude that empirical reseazch is mostly related to pre-decision and pre-action
processes such as determining goal desirability and categorization ofalternatives. Such
research has emphasized the diagnostic function that global, environmentally-induced moods,
such as feeling happy or sad, have in people's cognitive processes. Recently, Bagozzi et al.
(1998) observed that positive and negative anticipated affect stimulated the expenditure of
effort during the action phase. Although emotion research has established that specific
negative emotions, fear, distress, frustration, regret are accompanied by very different
feelings, thoughts, action tendencies, actions and emotivational goals (Roseman et al., 1994),
research on the role of specific emotions in the action and post-action phases is virtually
absent. This study examined informational and motivational implications of the regret that
people anticipate in the action phase, and it examined the regret that people experience in the
post-action phase. Regret is a specific goal-directed emotion (Bagozzi et al., 1998), that isRegret and ~~ induws ofopporttmih
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anticipated and experienced when people feel personally responsible for the outcomes of
behaviors (Zeelenberg et al., 1998). and when alternative behaviors might be or might have
been better. Our tinding that behavioral intentions accompanied with anticipated regret are
more predictive of active behavior in a window of opportunity testifies to the motivational
properties of anticipated regret. This underlines the importance ofexamining the role of
regret, or more general, specific goal-directed emotions, in the action sequence.
Although many of the regrets that people experience are regrets about the specific
choices made (Hattiangadi et al., 1995), the preponderance of research has emphasized the
effect ofaction versus inaction. In a window ofopportunity with multiple choice options,
people have to decide to act or not, and if they decide to act, they have to choose one option
over the others. Our results show that both act-inconsistency and choice-inconsistency
systematically drive the experience ofregret, which underlines the importance ofexamining
other fundamental mechanisms that promote regret in the action sequence, beyond action-
inaction.
The effects that intention-behavior inconsistency had on the regret people experienced
after the elections express that it hurts to waste a window ofopportunity. The strong efiects
of anticipated regret on intention-behavior consistency express that people attempt to avoid
the experience of regret. The tinding that people who were choice-inconsistent anticipated the
highest regret ofmaking the wrong choice before the elections, and actually experienced the
highest regret ofthe specific choice they made after the elections indicates that regret can not
always be avoided.
In this study, people were surveyed multiple times before the actual elections about
their intended voting-behavior in the elections. 3uch repeated measurement has been used to
manipulate attitude strength (e.g., Fazio, 1995), and it is likety to increase attitude-intention-
behavior consistency (Wegener et al., 1995; Visser, Krosnick, Marquette, 8c Curtin, 1996). In
fact, the participants in our study expressed high levels ofconsistency between their voting
intentions and behavior. But, despite the high and possibly elevated levels of consistency, we
obtained significant and substantial moderating effects ofanticipated regret, even when
accounting for the effects of attitude strength. In addition, while previous research hasRegret and windows of opportunity
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cmphasized moderating effects on the attitude-behavior relationship (Kraus, 1995), this study
examined moderating effects on the intention-behavior relationship. Since, behavioral
intentions generally tend to be more predictive of behavior than attitudes the signiticant
moderating effects of anticipated regret in this study appear particularly telling.
This study examined a specific window of opportunity in which people had to
actively behave to make use ofthe opportunity to vote, that is, action was effortful and
inaction was easy. In other windows ofopportunity, people are actively induced or called
upon to behave, and it may be effortful to resist such attempts. In such cases, inaction may be
more effortful than action (i.e., compliance). For instance, telemarketing effort to sell
magazine subscriptions, may need active resistance on the part of the receiver. In such cases,
people who intend to not sign up will be more likely to not sign-up, that is, to be act-
consistent by omission, ifthey anticipate a high level ofregret ifthey would sign up. In other
words, anticipated regret may be helpful when planning to act on opportunities when they
manifest themselves, but also as a strategy for self-control when attempting to resist
temptations. 'I'hus, the role of anticipated regret in stimulating act-consistency by commission
or act-consistency by omission is likely to depend on the specific behavior under study, and
whether action or inaction is most efTortful. Future research may want to examine these and
further effects of anticipated regret in the action sequence, under various configurations of
the effort of action and inaction and ofthe attractiveness of the opportunity.
Future research may also want to examine more closely the role ofoutcomes versus
decisions in determining people's experienced regret. For instance our finding that intention-
behavior inconsistency determined the regret that people experíenced, independent ofthe
outcomes ofthe specific choices that people made, suggests that regret may be determined
both by the process ofdecision-making and by the outcomes of decisions. It may be
worthwhile to examine when it is affectively better to be consistent than to be right: Under
which conditions the process ofdecision-making is more important than the outcomes of
decisions in promoting experienced regret.Regret and windows of opportunitq
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Foot Notes
I. Pseudo R' is defined as 1- L t ~ Lp , with L t indicating the log-likelihood of the
model that is esiimated, and Lp indicating the log-likelihood of the null model, without
predictors (e.g., Long 1997). Interpretation is the same as the R' in regression analysis.Regrrt and ~~ indows ofopportunity
1~able 1
Mean scores of the tive act- and choice-consistencv groups
Mean Scores Test ofDifference
Pazameter Group A Group C Crroup D Group E x'- ~ F p
(n - 59) (n - 44) (n - 105) (n - 911)
ecency o mtentton sta t rty o 0 0 . o ~.
Frequency of intention stability 5.02a 4.16 4.28 4.95' 7.150 ~.001
Amount of thirtking 2.08' 3.14b 4.31` 4.40` 53.795 ~.001
Anticipa[ed regret not acting 2.20' 3.506 4.64` 5.41' 95527 ~.001
Anticipated regret choice 2.29' 2.996 3.46 3.06" 8.286 ~.001
xpenence regret not acttng . . ~.
Experienced regret choice n.a. n.a. 1.81 1.35 31.496 ~.001
NOTE: Group A- intention not act - not act
Group C- intention act - not act
Group D - intention choose x- choose y
Group E- intention choose x- choose x
Df s are 3, I 118, except for recency of stability, where dJ- 3, and experienced regret choice, where dJ- l, 1015.
Different superscripts indicate significant differences in posthoc (LSD) tests atp ~.OS
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Table 2
[mnact of anticipated re~~ret on act- and choice-consistencti : Multinomial lot;it analysis
Parameter
onstant
Recency of intention stabilit}'
Frequency of intention stability
Amount ofIhinking




Group A ~ E




- I .063 ~.00I
578 ~.001
1953
NOTE: Group A- intention not act - not act
Group C- intention act - not act
Group D- intention choose x- choose y
Group E- intention choose x- choose x
,p~ [If
Group C ~ E






Group D ~ E
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